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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Case No. 890652-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. s 
CHRISTOPHER GRAY, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions of aggravated assault, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(1990); assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990); and unlawful detention, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Was defendant denied his sixth amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel? Review of this issue is based 
on a determination whether counsel's performance was deficient 
and whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
2. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to 
sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, assault 
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and unlawful detention? Review of this issue compels this Court 
to view the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict. This Court may not 
reverse a jury verdict unless it determines that the evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crimes of which he was convicted. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). Accord State 
v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Christopher Gray, was charged on December 
30, 1988, with one count of aggravated kidnapping, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1990), and ten 
counts of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 
6-8). On January 27, 1989, six of the ten original aggravated 
assault counts were reduced by an amended information to assault, 
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(1990) (R. at 11). From July 26 through 28, 1989, a jury trial 
was held in the district court (R. at 119-127). At the close of 
the State's evidence the parties entered into a stipulation 
consolidating the counts against defendant into three separate 
charges: Count I, aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1990); Count II, 
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aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990); and Count III, assault, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990) (R. 
at 132; Transcript, December 27, 1989 [hereinafter T2.] at 152-
155). Guilty verdicts were returned on counts II and III (R. at 
232-233). Defendant was found guilty of a lesser included 
offense of count I, unlawful detention, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (1990) (R. at 231). On 
October 2, 1989, defendant was sentenced to two 6 month terms for 
counts I and III and an indeterminate term of zero to five years 
for count II to be served consecutively in the Utah State Prison 
(R. at 244-249). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 6, 1988, the victim, Nancy Gray, had lunch 
with a co-worker, Debra Jean Dokos (Transcript, December 26, 
1989, [hereinafter Tl.] at 78, 152; T2. at 70). While she was at 
lunch, Nancy received a phone call from defendant (Tl. at 80). 
When Nancy returned his call a short while later, defendant told 
her he was upset that she had gone to lunch without first calling 
him to see if it was okay (Tl. at 80, 153). That same afternoon, 
at approximately 3:30 p.m., defendant picked Nancy up from her 
work as a computer programmer and drove her to a part-time job 
The transcript of defendant's trial is contained in three 
volumes, one for each day of trial. The transcript for the 
second day of trial, December 27, 1989, is designated as T2; the 
designations will be Tl for December 26, 1989 and T3 for December 
28, 1989. 
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interview (Tl. at 81-83). Defendant and Nancy did not talk to 
each other from the time he picked her up until they reached the 
interview at 13th South and State Street (Tl. at 82, 154). As 
Nancy climbed out of the truck, defendant yelled at her to find 
out how long she would be because he would not wait for her (Tl. 
at 82). When Nancy came back out of the building to tell 
defendant how long the interview would take, he had the stereo 
playing loudly and refused to either look at Nancy or roll down 
the window to let her give him an answer (Tl. at 82). After the 
interview, Nancy waited an hour for defendant to pick her up 
before finally taking a cab to their apartment at 2003 Fallwood 
Drive (Tl. 82-83, 155-156). Upon her return home, Nancy met 
defendant on his way out the door (Tl. at 84, 155-156). 
Defendant told Nancy that he was very upset and angary and that he 
needed to get out of the house for a while (Tl. at 84). Nancy 
remained at the apartment by herself and went to bed at 10:00 
p.m. (Tl. at 84). 
Early the next morning, December 7, 1988, at 
approximately 2:30 a.m., Nancy was awakened by defendant when he 
walked into the bedroom where she was sleeping and flipped on the 
light (Tl. at 85). Defendant, who had been drinking, angrily 
picked up the telephone and handed it to Nancy telling her to 
call Dokos so he could double check whether she had had lunch 
with Nancy the day before (Tl. at 85, 157-60). When Nancy 
responded that she did not have Dokos's home phone number, 
2 
Defendant and Nancy shared the use of Nancy's 1988 Toyota 
pickup truck, purchased by Nancy prior to their marriage on July 
24, 1988, as defendant did not have a vehicle of his own. 
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defendant became angry and threw the telephone receiver at her, 
striking Nancy in the leg (Tl. at 86). Nancy asked defendant to 
stop, whereupon he again handed her the phone and told Nancy to 
call Dokos (Tl. at 86). This time Nancy reminded defendant that 
he had thrown Dokos's home telephone number away during a prior 
altercation (Tl. at 86). Defendant became angered and threw the 
receiver at Nancy again, striking her in the right arm (Tl. at 
86-87; State's exhibit #15). At this point, Nancy began to cry 
and plead with defendant to stop (Tl. at 87). Defendant 
responded by throwing the receiver at her a third time, striking 
Nancy in the left hip (Tl. at 87, 160; Transcript, December 28, 
1989 [hereinafter T3.] at 37; State's exhibit #14). 
Defendant then sat down on the edge of the bed and 
asked Nancy how long she had been at lunch (Tl. at 88). Nancy 
told him that she was not sure, reminding defendant that he had 
broken her watch during a previous argument (Tl. at 88). With 
this explanation, defendant demanded to see the watch and 
attempted to wind it before becoming even angrier and flipping 
the metal watchband in Nancy's eye, blinding her for several 
hours (Tl. at 88-89; T3. at 41; State's exhibits #8, #11 and 
#12). Crying, Nancy pleaded with defendant to stop; instead, he 
slugged her forehead, cutting her with the rings on his right 
hand and twisted her left forearm, threatening to break it (Tl. 
at 89-90; State's exhibits #11-#13). As Nancy tried to pull 
away, defendant reached over and began choking her stating, "I 
have to teach you who is boss in this family. You have to learn 
who to obey and who to listen to" (Tl. at 90). 
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Nancy watched as defendant took her .22 Beretta from 
the nightstand near the bed and began playing with the bullets 
(Tl. at 91-93)• Defendant wondered out loud, "What if I forgot 
how many bullets are in this gun?" and then held the gun to 
Nancy's head, pulling the trigger (Tl. at 94, 166). Ignoring 
Nancy's pleas to stop, defendant slapped her and told Nancy to 
"shut up" or it would get worse (Tl. at 95). Defendant hit Nancy 
in the head with the butt of the gun several times, stating that 
he had to hit her to get her attention (Tl. at 95, 167). 
Ordering Nancy to open her mouth, defendant then forced the 
barrel of the gun into Nancy's mouth and held it there for 
approximately two minutes telling her to lie very still or the 
"hairy trigger" would go off (Tl. at 96). After defendant 
removed the gun from her mouth, Nancy attempted to sit up and get 
away, blocking defendant's blow to her chest with her right hand 
(Tl. at 96-97, 168; State's exhibits #7 and #10). Once defendant 
gained control of Nancy, he forced the gun barrel into her mouth 
a second time and again threatened to teach her who was boss (Tl. 
at 97). Defendant told Nancy to "Make your peace with God" 
because they were both going out that night (Tl. at 97). 
Defendant stated, "I won't go to jail for you, bitch," and told 
Nancy that after he killed her, he would take his own life (Tl. 
at 97). 
After threatening to kill her, defendant told Nancy 
that he wanted to have sex and that if she refused he would "take 
it" (Tl. at 98). Standing in front of her, defendant ordered 
Nancy to undress and get back into the bed (Tl. at 98). 
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Defendant then forced Nancy to have anal and oral sex with him 
(Tl a/t , 99-100; T2. at 3-4), when she begged him to stop, 
defendant forced Nancy to drink his urine, slapping and pulling 
her hair when she tried to refuse (Tl. at 100; T2. at 5). 
Defendant next ordered Nancy to get out of bed and 
crawl into the living room (Tl. at 101). As she did so, 
defendant pulled Nancy's hair with his hands, lifting her from 
the floor and dragging her to the kitchen where he hit her head 
into the cupboard twice (Tl. at 101-102). After hitting her head 
into the kitchen cupboard, defendant dragged Nancy into the 
living room and told her to lie on her back with her legs spread 
toward him (Tl. at 102). As Nancy cried, defendant sat in a 
chair opposite her holding a lighted cigarette lighter between 
Nancy's legs and threatened to burn her if she moved (Tl. at 102-
103; T2. at 5). Telling her that it would get worse if she did 
not shut up, defendant picked up a candle approximately one foot 
long and three inches wide and told Nancy he was going to shove 
the candle up her vagina (Tl. at 103; T2. at 5-6). When Nancy 
pleaded with him to stop, defendant kicked Nancy in her vagina 
(Tl. at 103-104; T2. at 6). Doubling his fist, defendant told 
Nancy he wanted to see if it would fit inside her vagina and then 
put his fist between her legs as if he were going to insert it 
(Tl. at 104; T2, at 6) . 
After threatening Nancy with his fist, defendant 
nrdered her back onto her hands and knees (Tl at 106). Coming 
up behind Nancy, defendant inserted his fingers into her rectum, 
grabbed the muscle and lifted Nancy off the floor (Tl. at 106; 
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T2. at 7-8). When she screamed, defendant threatened Nancy again 
that if she made any more noise, it would get worse (Tl. at 106). 
He then pulled on her rectum a second time, lifting Nancy off the 
floor again (Tl. at 106-107; T2. at 7-8). Apparently, defendant 
then punched Nancy in the stomach and kicked her in the ribs 
before forcing her to crawl to the bathroom where he ordered 
Nancy to crawl into the bathtub and proceeded to urinate on her 
(Tl. at 107; T2. at 8-10). Following this, defendant again 
forced Nancy to drink his urine, slapping her when she attempted 
to spitsit out (Tl. at 108; T2. at 13). Defendant then pushed 
Nancy down into the tub while he filled it with cold water, 
telling her she was not to get out or he would "blow her brains 
out" (Tl. at 108; T2. at 13-14). Before leaving the bathroom 
defendant threatened to blow Nancy's brains out if she moved and 
turned on the bathroom fan and air conditioner telling her, "This 
is so you will just be nice and comfortable" (Tl. at 109; T2. at 
14). While lying in the tub over the next several hours, Nancy 
could hear defendant pacing outside the bathroom door (Tl. at 
109; T2. at 14-15). Off and on through the remainder of the 
night, defendant would burst through the bathroom door to see if 
Nancy had moved (Tl. at 109-110; T2. at 15-16). 
The next morning, December 7, 1989, defendant allowed 
Nancy out of the tub and told her to get back into bed (Tl. at 
110; T2. at 17). Defendant remained approximately one or two 
feet behind Nancy as he walked her down the hall to the bedroom 
(Tl. at 110). Stating that he wanted to have sex again, 
defendant ordered Nancy into bed where he forced her to have 
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vaginal sex (Tl. at 111; T2. at 18). When he was through, 
defendant fuM NatK-y • I'" nvidf him sick and that he wanted nothing 
more to do with her (Tl. *.t' 111). Defendant then gave Nancy a 
white pill about the size of an aspirin and told her it would 
help her relax | T) , a\ 111; 'I1.1 at 19). After Nancy took the 
pill, defendant held a gun on her and ordered her to call her 
office and tell them she would not be coming in (Tl. at 111-112; 
T2. at 20, 48). Defendant then forced her back into bed with 
himf wrapping his arms around her so tightly that she could not 
move (Tl. at 112-113; T2. at 23). When Nancy awoke several hours 
later at approximately 6:00 p.m., defendant came into the bedroom 
and told her to shower and clean up (Tl. at 113; T2. at 21). 
After Nancy showered, defendant stood in the doorway of 
the bathroom and ordered her into the living room (Tl. at 114). 
Telling her that she had "fucked up again," defendant sat with 
his arm around Nancy until they went to bed later that evening 
(Tl. at 115-116). As he had done the night before, defendant 
wrapped his arms around Nancy preventing any movement by her (Tl. 
at 117). 
When Nancy awoke the morning of December 8, defendant 
was already up and dressed (Tl. at 117). Defendant stated that 
since he could not hurt her any more "emotionally," he would do 
it "physically" (Tl. at 118). Again, holding a gun on her, 
defendant ordered Nancy to call her office a second time and 
threatened that if she ever went for help he would "hunt" her 
down and "kill" her (Tl. at 120; T2. at 48). Vowing to make 
Nancy's life miserable, defendant stated he was going to have a 
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"good time" and act as though he were single by bringing women 
home (Tl. at 120). Defendant then ordered Nancy to start 
cleaning the apartment and made sure she was always within his 
eyesight, "dogging" her every move with his pistol tucked into 
the waistband of his pants (Tl. at 121-122; T2. at 24). Towards 
evening, defendant allowed Nancy to eat a "few bites" of stew and 
announced he was going out that night to find some women (Tl. at 
123). At approximately 8:30 p.m., while defendant was in the 
shower and after making sure he had soap on his face, Nancy ran 
down the hall grabbing her purse, coat, and some gold jewelry 
defendant had purchased on her credit card (Tl. at 124). She 
escaped to the truck and drove around for a while before stopping 
at a grocery store where she purchased a comb, toothbrush and 
other personal items (Tl. at 129). Because defendant had 
threatened to kill her family if she asked them for help, Nancy 
drove to the home of an old friend, Victoria Marks, whom she had 
not seen for a few years and whom defendant had never met (Tl. at 
127-129; T2. at 26-27, 32-33, 53-57). When Nancy arrived at 
Marks' apartment, Marks noticed bruises around Nancy's eyes and 
that Nancy appeared tense and scared (T2. at 54-55). 
The next day, December 9, 1989, Nancy met with Dokos 
who also noticed the bruises on Nancy's hip, eye, arm and head 
(T2. at 96). Dokos accompanied Nancy to the Alta View Emergency 
Room where Nancy was examined by Dr. Thomas Weed (Tl. at 99; 
State's exhibit #21). Dr. Weed found several contusions and 
tender spots which appeared to have been caused when Nancy was 
choked and struck on the head, chest, back and hand by defendant 
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(T2. at 102, 111-112; State's exhibits #7-#8, #10-#16). Although 
Dr. Weed found no bruises on Nancy's stomach, he testified that a 
punch to the stomach would not necessarily leave a bruise (T2. at 
104-105). Dr. Weed requested that Nancy have a pelvic 
examination but apparently an exam was not performed (T2. at 103-
105). 
Other evidence will be discussed in the body of this 
brief, pertinent to the specific arguments. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant was not denied his sixth amendment right to 
the effective assistance of counsel. He alleges that counsel's 
performance was ineffective but fails to demonstrate, in any of 
his allegations, that the deficient performance was a reality as 
required by the first prong of the Strickland test. Even if 
defendant had made such a showing, he does not meet the second 
prong of the Strickland test, which requires a showing that he 
was actually prejudiced by counsel's performance. 
The evidence presented at trial, together with all 
reasonable inferences, is sufficient to sustain defendants 
convictions for aggravated assault, assault and unlawful 
detainer. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL. 
Defendant appears to claim that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel due to his trial attorney's 
failure to (1) call certain witnesses, and (2) effectively cross-
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examine the victim, Nancy Gray. All of defendant's claims lack 
merit and should be summarily rejected. 
The accepted standard for a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on an ineffectiveness 
claim, a defendant "must show, first, that his or her counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, 
which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant." State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 
(1989) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). 
In State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203 (Utah 1984), 
the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Strickland standard as 
consistent with its previous holdings regarding effective 
assistance of counsel. Ici. at 1203 (citing Codianna v. Morris, 
660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983)). According to Lairby, the burden 
of proof lies with the defendant and counsel's ineffectiveness 
must be a demonstrable reality, not a speculative matter. Lairby, 
699 P.2d at 1203. Trial strategy or tactics do not rise to the 
level of ineffectiveness of counsel simply because they did not 
produce the anticipated result. Ld. The deficiency in 
performance must be prejudicial. Id. See Codianna, 660 P.2d at 
1109; State v. McNichol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976). To be 
prejudicial, there must be a "reasonable probability" that the 
outcome would be different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Reasonable probability means a "probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 
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1085, 1089 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
4 94), Mere speculatioi i tha ( : an outcome may have been differen t is 
not sufficient. State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Utah 
1987). 
A review of the trial record demonstrates that trial 
3 
counsel was prepared at trial and conducted an able defense. 
Further, defendant fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability 
that the outcome would have been different but for counsel's 
allegedly deficient performance. The evidence of defendant's 
guilt was overwhelming. Based solely on evidence about which 
defendant does not complain, a jury could have reasonably 
convicted defendant of the crimes charged: aggravated kidnapping, 
aggravated assault and assault. The victim, defendant's wife, 
testified that defendant held her captive in their apartment for 
approximately 48 hours, during which period of time he assaulted 
her with, among other things, a telephone receiver, a .22 Beretta 
and other guns, a metal watchband, a cigarette lighter and a one 
foot long, three inch wide candle (Tl. at 77-170). Defendant does 
not dispute that he hit Nancy with the telephone receiver and 
metal watchband or that he carried a gun the night the assault 
began (T3. at 37 and 41). This evidence, in conjunction with 
evidence detailed in Point II of this brief, demonstrates that 
there is no reasonable probability the outcome would have been 
different absent the alleged errors; thus, defendant fails to 
Significantly, defendant was charged with aggravated 
kidnapping, a first degree felony; however, the jury found 
defendant guilty of the lesser included offense, unlawful 
detention, a class B misdemeanor. 
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satisfy the second prong of Strickland, This alone defeats his 
ineffectiveness claim. See Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023. In any 
event, defendant's claims of deficient performance will be 
examined individually. 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel failed to (1) 
contact two alleged alibi witnesses and (2) was deficient in his 
cross-examination of the victim, Nancy Gray. According to 
defendant, trial counsel should have called two alibi witnesses: 
Joe Hunt and Bill Johnson. Defendant suggests that "effective 
assistance of counsel means counsel should have contacted these 
witnesses and secured them for trial." (Brief of Appellant 
[hereinafter Br. of App.] at 6). Defendant's assertions are 
speculative, as well as meritless, and reflect a misunderstanding 
of the Strickland standard for ineffectiveness claims. 
In State v. Crestani, this Court quoted Strickland for 
the principle that defense "counsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary." Id. at 1090 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91) (emphasis added). This Court 
determined that the total failure of Crestani's defense counsel to 
contact a rebuttal witness indicated a severe deficiency in his 
performance because he could not know whether the witness's 
testimony would have been helpful or not. Id. at 1090. 
When counsel knows of the existence of a 
person or persons who possess information 
relevant to his client's defense, and he 
fails to use due diligence to investigate 
that evidence, such a lack of industry cannot 
be justified as "strategic error.". . . 
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Id. at 1090 (quoting Jennings v. State, 744 P.2d 212, 214 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1987)). Crestani is distinguishable from defendant's 
case because defendant's trial counsel, as well as those defense 
counsel who represented defendant prior to trial used due 
diligence to try and locate defendant's alleged alibi witnesses 
4 (R. at 104-108) Defendant's counsel, unlike Crestani's defense 
counsel, ascertained that the alleged alibi witnesses (Hunt and 
Johnson) refused to corroborate defendant's story and would not be 
5 
credible witnesses at trial (R. 105). 
Notwithstanding the fact that both Hunt and Johnson 
refused to substantiate his story, defendant now asserts on appeal 
that he was prejudiced by the failure of his trial counsel to call 
Hunt and Johnson to testify. In fact, the opposite is true. 
Based on the record before him, it was reasonable for defendant's 
Defendant was originally represented by Brooke Wells of the 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (SLLDA) (R. at 22). 
Defendant apparently objected to his representation by Wells, 
whereupon Andrew A. Valdez, also of SLLDA, was appointed to 
represent defendant (R. at 30, 48). During the course of a pre-
trial conference held May 8, 1989, defendant objected to his 
continued representation by Valdez (R. at 105). Subsequently, 
SLLDA made a motion to withdraw from representation of defendant 
due to a conflict of interest between SLLDA and defendant (R. at 
93). In a minute entry dated May 25, 1989, Judge Russon appointed 
Solomon Chacon to represent defendant at trial (R. at 96). 
5 
At the pretrial conference on May 8, 1989, defense counsel 
(Valdez) informed Judge Russon that an investigator for SLLDA, Ed 
Barton, had contacted both Hunt and Johnson in February 1989 and 
that both had refused to corroborate or substantiate defendant's 
story (R. at 104, 108). Further, defense counsel informed the 
court that both Hunt and Johnson had been given SLLDA's phone 
number and told to call if they could help at all in defendant's 
case and that, as of May 8, neither Hunt nor Johnson had contacted 
SLLDA with information (R. at 108-109). Although defendant 
claimed to have recently talked to both Hunt and Johnson, defense 
counsel replied that he had only been able to recontact Hunt and 
that Hunt had again refused to substantiate defendant's story (R. 
at 104-107). 
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trial counsel not to invest further efforts in locating witnesses 
who had previously refused to substantiate defendant's story. 
Instead, trial counsel made the most of the situation by providing 
defendant with the opportunity at trial to assert that he had 
alibi witnesses but had been unable to locate them for trial (T3. 
at 52). Based on the above, it is clear that defendant's counsel 
both prior to and during trial used due diligence to investigate 
defendant's alleged alibi witnesses and none were forthcoming. 
Thus, defendant has failed to show that his defense was deficient 
or that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's strategy. 
Defendant further asserts that his trial counsel's 
performance was deficient during cross-examination of the victim 
in two respects: (1) failing to vigorously cross-examine the 
victim concerning alleged inconsistencies between her testimony at 
the preliminary hearing and her testimony at trial, and (2) 
eliciting testimony concerning previous violent acts of defendant 
(Br. of App. at 7). 
Defendant's theory of the case was that although he 
fought with his wife and threatened to "knock the shit out of 
her," he did not harm her to the extent she claimed (T3. at 60). 
Defense counsel pursued that theory by cross-examination of the 
victim (Tl. at 143-170; T2. at 1-33, 50-51) and others who 
testified concerning the extent of her injuries (T2. at 57-64, 67, 
97-99, 107-112, 129-30). Defendant does not indicate on appeal 
what counsel could have done to further bolster defendant's theory 
in this regard. Rather, defendant speculates that the victim's 
testimony changed from the time of the preliminary hearing to the 
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time of trial and that his trial counsel was deficient in not 
vigorously cross-examining the victim as to these alleged 
inconsistencies. 
In support of his argument, defendant merely states 
that "the time of detention testified to at preliminary hearing 
was much longer than the time testified to at trial" (Br. of App. 
at 7). Even assuming defense counsel was deficient in not 
emphasizing this alleged inconsistency during cross-examination of 
the victim, defendant has failed to demonstrate any resulting 
prejudice. The exact length of time the victim was detained by 
defendant is not a material element of any of the crimes charged 
or of which defendant was convicted: aggravated kidnapping, 
aggravated assault, assault, and unlawful detention. 
Furthermore, it is an appellant's burden to provide an adequate 
record on appeal. In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 
(Utah 1989); Campbelt International Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 
1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). See also Utah R. App. P. 11. Defendant 
has not provided this Court with a transcript of the preliminary 
hearing or otherwise specified what the alleged inconsistencies in 
the victim's testimony might have been. See State v. Robbins, 709 
P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985) (where defendant failed to provide a 
trial transcript on appeal, Utah Supreme Court presumed regularity 
in the proceedings below). See also State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1988) (court may decline to rule on argument 
unsupported by legal analysis or authority). Thus, defendant has 
not demonstrated that trial counsel's performance was deficient or 
that he was prejudiced as a result. 
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Finally, defendant asserts that his trial counsel was 
deficient in cross-examination of the victim when he elicited 
testimony concerning previous violent acts by defendant (Br. of 
App. at 7-8; T2. at 146-151). From the record, it is apparent 
that trial counsel was attempting to show that the events of 
December 6-8, 1989, were merely a series of unfortunate domestic 
disputes between newlyweds, not the violent episode of captivity 
described by the victim (Tl. at 146-151). Legitimate choices of 
tactics or strategy by an attorney will not normally fall below 
the standard of reasonableness. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 
159-160 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 3270 
(1990), State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 191 (Utah 1988). See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "[S]trategic choices made after 
thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible 
options are virtually unchallengeable." Id. at 690. See 
Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1090. The Utah Supreme Court has said, 
"[t]his Court will not second guess the strategy of counsel at 
trial." State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982). Likewise, 
this Court should not second guess trial counsel's strategy in 
this case. By eliciting testimony concerning previous violent 
acts of defendant during cross-examination of the victim, trial 
counsel was attempting to diffuse her allegations against 
defendant. As in his other claims of ineffectiveness, defendant 
has failed to show that trial counsel was deficient or that he was 
prejudiced by the alleged deficiency. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL ESTABLISHED 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT DEFENDANT'S GUILT 
OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
Defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial 
was not sufficient to support his conviction of aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 
76-5-103 (1990), which reads: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if 
he commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 or other means or 
force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury. 
The jury was fully advised as to these definitions and each 
requisite element of the offense (R. at 213 and 215, Court's 
Instructions to the Jury, Instructions No. 17 and 18). 
The standard for review of a sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge is well-established: 
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences 
which may be drawn therefrom must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990) defines assault as 
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
or 
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another. 
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the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. . . . 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)- Accord State 
v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Further, 
since a jury is in the best position to give "proper weight to the 
peripheral nature of [any] contradictory testimony," State v. 
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
[i]t is not this court's duty to measure 
conflicting evidences or the credibility of 
witnesses. That responsibility belongs 
strictly to the trier of fact. "It is the 
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the 
evidence and to determine the credibility of 
the witnesses. So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, 
from which findings of all requisite elements 
of the crime can reasonably be made, [the 
court's] inquiry stops." . . . 
Id. at 27 (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985)). Accord State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475 
(Utah 1989). 
The Utah Supreme Court has implicitly stated that the 
uncorroborated testimony of the victim of an assault can be 
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the defendant if the 
jury finds that testimony sufficiently credible and compelling. 
In State v. Archuleta, the court declared: 
[T]he principal evidence supporting the 
conviction in this case consisted of the 
victim's testimony, there being no decisively 
corroborating physical evidence. We again 
decline to adopt the position that the 
testimony of a rape victim, without more, 
cannot support a conviction. We are 
especially reluctant to do so in a case such 
as this, where nothing contradicted the 
victim's testimony. 
The physical evidence in this case did not 
contradict the victim's version of the 
events. . . . While the jury could have 
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adopted the interpretation of the facts that 
defendant advocates on appeal, it did not. 
Where evidence lends itself to varying 
interpretations, we will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the jury. 
Id. at 1021-22. 
Turning to the facts adduced at trial and their 
reasonable inferences, it is clear from the testimony of Nancy 
Gray that defendant used a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning 
7 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1990) to assault her. Nancy 
testified that over the course of 48 hours, December 6-8, 1989, 
defendant (1) hit her with a telephone receiver three times; (2) 
held the barrel of a .22 Beretta in her mouth twice; (3) flipped a 
metal watchband in her eye; (4) held a flaming cigarette lighter 
between her legs near her pubic hair; and (5) threatened to shove 
a one foot long, three inch wide candle into her vagina (Tl. at 
86-122, 160-168; T2. at 2-11, 48). Nancy's testimony was 
corroborated in part by defendant, who did not deny hitting Nancy 
with the telephone receiver, flipping a metal watchband in her 
eye, or having a gun with him during the 48 hour detention (T3. at 
37-41, 61 71). Thus, the testimony of the victim was not so 
inherently improbable that this Court would be justified in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1990) defines a dangerous weapon as 
any item capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury, or a facsimile or 
representation of the item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use 
of the item leads the victim to 
reasonably believe the item is likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim 
verbally or in any other manner that he 
is in control of such an item. 
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substituting its opinion for that of the jury. The jurors were 
able to observe the witnesses at trial and judge their 
credibility. The jurors also may have made legitimate inferences 
about the credibility of the victim from the testimony of Victoria 
Marks, Debra Jean Dokos, Dr. Thomas S. Weed and Dennis R. Couch 
who all testified concerning the victim's physical and emotional 
state (T2. at 53-67, Testimony of Marks; T2. at 72-99, Testimony 
of Dokos; T2. at 107-113, Testimony of Weed; T2. at 122-130, 
Testimony of Couch). 
In addition to the above testimony, Scott Bearden 
testified that he helped defendant look for Nancy and her truck 
early in the morning of December 9, 1989 and that defendant was 
carrying a "pistol" at that time (T2. at 117-121). When the 
evidence is taken as a whole and the proper standard of review 
applied, it is clear that there is more than sufficient evidence 
to sustain defendant's aggravated assault conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this IAi day of November, 1990. 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
i 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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